Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
attitude as the sentence "p", that a sentence expresses a belief if and only if it can be true, and that an object has a property if and only if this property can be ascribed to it with a true sentence. 2 For example, consider the judgement that euthanasia is wrong. If non-cognitivism is true, this judgement is a non-cognitive attitude, such as an attitude of disapproval of euthanasia. Non-cognitivists who accept minimalism think that this attitude can be expressed not only with the sentence Euthanasia is wrong, but also with the sentence "Euthanasia is wrong" is true.
They therefore think that the judgement that euthanasia is wrong is not only an attitude of disapproval, but also a belief. And if they disapprove of euthanasia themselves, they think that euthanasia has the property of being wrong. For this property can be ascribed to it with the sentence "Euthanasia is wrong", which they think is true.
There are now two possibilities. The first is that non-cognitivists agree with cognitivists that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties in a single sense of the terms 'belief' and 'property' . I then do not need to write the rest of this paper, since non-cognitivists agree with everything that cognitivists say. The second possibility is that non-cognitivists agree with cognitivists that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but not in the same sense of the terms 'belief' and 'property'. I then do need to write the rest of this paper, since the apparent agreement 2 Horwich 1993 proposes a minimalist account of the truth of normative judgements, and Blackburn 1998, pp. 77-83, and Gibbard 2003, p. 18 , endorse such an account (though not in the way Horwich proposes). For discussion of the relation between non-cognitivism and minimalism about truth, see Jackson, Oppy and Smith 1994 , Smith 1994b and 1994c , Divers and Miller 1994 and 1995 , and Dreier 1996 and 2004 between cognitivists and non-cognitivists masks a deeper disagreement. That is what I shall assume to be the case.
To make this disagreement explicit, I shall take cognitivism to be the following view:
Normative judgements aim to represent the world. Whether these judgements succeed at representing the world wholly depends on what the world is like: it depends on whether objects in the world have the normative properties that these judgements ascribe to them.
And I shall take non-cognitivism to be the following view:
Normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. These judgements ascribe normative properties to objects in the world, but whether these objects have these properties does not wholly depend on what the world is like. 3 Everyone agrees that if a normative judgement ascribes a descriptive property, part of this judgement aims to represent the world. 4 For example, suppose that Susan thinks that Fred's dishonesty is wrong. Susan's normative judgement then ascribes the descriptive property of being dishonest to Fred. This part of her judgement clearly aims to represent the world. But
Susan's judgement also ascribes the normative property of being wrong to Fred's dishonesty.
I shall take cognitivists and non-cognitivists to disagree about whether this normative part of a normative judgement aims to represent the world. 3 This claim is also made by Horgan and Timmons' cognitivist expressivism, which they take to be a version of cognitivism (see Horgan and Timmons 2006a and 2006b , and also Timmons 1999 and Horgan and Timmons 2000 . I take this view to be a version of non-cognitivism. It would perhaps be clearer to call cognitivism 'representationalism' and non-cognitivism 'non-representationalism', but I shall continue to use these views' familiar names. 4 I take a property to be descriptive if and only if it can be ascribed with a descriptive predicate. As before, this claim need not be regarded as a definition. 5 Many philosophers now defend views that combine elements of non-cognitivism with elements of cognitivism: see, for example, Copp 2001 , Ridge 2006 , 2007 and 2009 , and Boisvert 2008 Does this make the disagreement between cognitivists and non-cognitivists explicit?
You may think not, since non-cognitivists may also be minimalists about representation: they may think that the sentence "p succeeds at representing the world" expresses the same attitude as the sentence "p", and that a sentence expresses an attitude that aims to represent the world if and only if this sentence can succeed at representing the world. 6 But if noncognitivists keep retreating to minimalism, they will end up agreeing with everything that cognitivists say. As before, I then do not need to write the rest of this paper. I shall therefore assume that non-cognitivists will not keep retreating to minimalism. Since it forces me to write the rest of this paper, this is a charitable assumption.
Asymmetry
We normally take conflicts between normative judgements to be asymmetrical: we normally think that (A) When two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct.
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For example, suppose that Fred thinks that euthanasia is always permissible and Susan thinks that it is always impermissible. We may then think that Fred's judgement is correct, or we may think that Susan's judgement is correct, or we may think that neither judgement is correct. But we will not think that both judgements are correct. Euthanasia cannot be both always permissible and always impermissible.
We may not take (A) to be true of normative judgements that differ in imprecise philosophers think that normative judgements partly aim to represent the world the way cognitivists think they do, but that the properties these judgements ascribe are not irreducibly normative. I do not have space to discuss these views here, but I think they face either the objections to reductive realism I put forward in Streumer 2011 or the argument against non-cognitivism I shall put forward below. These three simple attempts to show that non-cognitivism is compatible with (A) therefore fail. Non-cognitivists need to show in a more sophisticated way that their view is compatible with (A).
A quasi-realist attempt
They could next try to show that their view is compatible with (A) by making use of Simon
Blackburn's work. Consider the following claim:
(M) What makes an action right or wrong is not that we approve or disapprove of this action.
We may think that non-cognitivism is incompatible with (M). If normative judgements are attitudes of approval or disapproval, we may think, these attitudes are the only things that can make an action right or wrong. But Blackburn disagrees. He claims that (M) expresses the following attitude:
(M*) Disapproval of treating our own attitudes of approval or disapproval as grounds for approving or disapproving of an action.
13 13 Blackburn 1984 , p. 218, 1993 , pp. 153, 157, 172-3, and 1998 claims that moral judgements are attitudes of approval or disapproval (1984, p. 192 ), but he often simply says that they are 'attitudes ' (1984, pp. 167, 188) or 'conative' states or stances (1993, pp. 168, 178) . He rightly notes that "approval and attitude are natural terms to work with, but it would not matter if neither fitted exactly or if better terms for the state in question existed", as long as "the state is worth distinguishing from belief, or at least from belief with representational truth conditions thought of realistically" (1993, p. 184) .
If it expresses this attitude of disapproval, (M) is compatible with non-cognitivism.
Blackburn also argues that sentences that contain unasserted normative clauses express attitudes of approval or disapproval, that we can regard changes in our own attitudes of approval or disapproval as improvements, and that the truth of a normative judgement is its membership of a set of attitudes of approval or disapproval that cannot be further improved.
14 In this way, he thinks, non-cognitivists 'earn the right' to say that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties and that can be true, especially if they also endorse minimalism about beliefs, properties and truth. Blackburn 1984 , pp. 189-96, 1993 , pp. 125-7, 182-97, and 1998 , pp. 70-77. Blackburn 1993 , proposes an interpretation of such claims as expressions of attitudes of approval or toleration. For Blackburn's account of the truth of normative judgements as membership of a set of attitudes of approval or disapproval that cannot be further improved, see Blackburn 1984, pp. 197-202 . Blackburn does not wholeheartedly endorse this account, however, and Blackburn 1998 appeals more directly to minimalism about truth. 15 Blackburn 1998, pp. 77-83, 294-8 . He stresses that, before non-cognitivists can make use of minimalism in this way, "the commitments must first be understood in other terms" (1998, p. 80) . See also Blackburn 1996, pp. 86, 92, and 1999, p. 217. 16 See Blackburn 1984 Blackburn , 1993 Blackburn and 1998 . For his denial that quasi-realism is a version of noncognitivism, see Blackburn 1996, pp. 82-3, and 1998, p. 85 . In his later work, Blackburn calls both non-cognitivism and quasi-realism 'expressivism'. As Lenman 2003 notes, quasi-realism "is more or less synonymous with Simon Blackburn" (p. 34 n. 7), but Allan Gibbard endorses it as well (2003 pp. 18-9, 112) , and many non-cognitivists have considerable sympathy for it. 17 Though Blackburn does not discuss (A), he does discuss bivalence (1984, pp. 203-10, and 1993, pp. 23-30) , and his discussion of bivalence suggests an interpretation of (A) as expressing the attitude described by (A*). Alternatively, Blackburn could also interpret the claim that one of two particular conflicting normative judgements is correct as expressing a particular attitude of approval or disapproval in an emphatic way, and he could then interpret (A) as a generalization of such emphatic expressions of particular attitudes of approval or disapproval. But it is difficult to see how (A) can be For example, suppose again that Fred thinks that euthanasia is always permissible and Susan thinks that it is always impermissible. And suppose that Fred and Susan both take (A) to be true: they both think that at most one of these judgements is correct. If normative judgements are attitudes of approval or disapproval and (A) expresses the attitude described by (A*),
Fred then has the following attitudes:
Approval of allowing people to have euthanasia, and disapproval of both approving and disapproving of allowing people to have euthanasia.
And Susan has the following attitudes:
Disapproval of allowing people to have euthanasia, and disapproval of both approving and disapproving of allowing people to have euthanasia.
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If (A) expresses the attitude described by (A*) and we all have this attitude, non-cognitivists could therefore say, their view is compatible with (A). But suppose that Bob and Kate do take (L) to be true: they both think that at most one of their a generalization of such emphatic expressions, since as I pointed out in §3 we can think that (A) is true without thinking that any particular normative judgement is correct. 18 I take the judgement that euthanasia is always permissible to be equivalent to the judgement that it is right to allow people to have euthanasia, and the judgement that euthanasia is always impermissible to be equivalent to the judgement that it is wrong to allow people to have euthanasia. I take 'allowing people to have euthanasia' to mean not stopping people from having euthanasia.
conflicting likes or dislikes is correct. And suppose that a philosopher then says that (L) expresses the following attitude:
(L*) A dislike of both liking and disliking a single thing.
If (L) expressed this dislike, Bob would have the following like and dislike:
A like of peanut butter and a dislike of both liking and disliking peanut butter.
And Kate would have the following dislikes:
A dislike of peanut butter and a dislike of both liking and disliking peanut butter. Instead, what is at issue is whether it is true that (2) If we all have the attitude of disapproval described by (A*), (A) is really true.
I agree that (1) is true: if (A) expresses the attitude of disapproval described by (A*) and we all have this attitude, then (A) is true. But I deny the first conjunct of the antecedent of (1): I deny that (A) expresses the attitude of disapproval described by (A*). I deny this because I think that (2) is false: I think that if we all have the attitude of disapproval described by (A*), this does not mean that (A) is really true. I take this to be shown by the fact that if Bob and
Kate have the dislike described by (L*), that similarly does not mean that (L) is really true.
Non-cognitivists could reply that they themselves do think that (2) is true: they think that if we have the attitude of disapproval described by (A*), (A) is really true. But I think that this would betray what Goldman and Pust call 'theory contamination'. 20 Non-cognitivists clearly do not accept (2) because it is pre-theoretically attractive to interpret (A) as expressing an attitude of disapproval. Instead, they accept (2) because they accept non-cognitivism for other reasons, and because, in order to defend non-cognitivism, they need to show that this view is compatible with (A). In other words, they accept (2) because their philosophical theory has contaminated their understanding of (A). It can be legitimate to revise a central pre-theoretical thought about something in order to accept a philosophical theory about this 19 To reinforce this point, they may appeal to minimalism: they may say that the sentence "(A) is true" expresses the same attitude as the sentence "(A)". 20 See Goldman and Pust 1998, pp. 183, 189. thing, but only if there is no defensible theory about this thing that is compatible with all of our central pre-theoretical thoughts about it. I shall argue in §7 that there is such a theory: the error theory, according to which normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties even though these properties do not exist. If that is so, it is not legitimate for noncognitivists to revise our pre-theoretical understanding of (A) in order to accept (2).
Non-cognitivists may accuse me of being a victim of theory contamination myself:
they may say that I reject (2) merely because I believe the error theory for other reasons, and because, in order to defend the error theory, I need to reject non-cognitivism. But I have argued elsewhere that we cannot believe the error theory, and 'we' includes me. 21 My rejection of (2) As a last resort, non-cognitivists could now repeat Blackburn's quasi-realist move.
They could say that my claim that (3) (A) does not express the attitude described by (A*)
itself expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval, such as:
(3*) Disapproval of believing that (A) expresses the attitude described by (A*).
But if non-cognitivists said this, my argument would simply repeat itself. Just as I deny that (2) is true, I also deny that (4) If we have the attitudes of disapproval described by (A*) and (3*), (A) and (3) are really true.
For just as the comparison between (A) and (L) shows that our having the attitude described by (A*) does not mean that (A) is really true, it also shows that our having the attitude described by (3*) does not mean that (3) is really true.
I therefore think that non-cognitivists cannot make use of Blackburn's quasi-realism to show that their view is compatible with (A). They need to show this in a different way.
A plan-expressivist attempt
Non-cognitivists could next try to show that their view is compatible with (A) by appealing to an argument that has been given by Allan Gibbard. According to Gibbard's planexpressivism, to think that you ought to do something is to adopt a plan. 23 Adopting a plan involves rejecting certain alternatives, which Gibbard calls 'not okay to do', and rejecting rejecting other alternatives, which he calls 'okay to do'.
Like Blackburn, Gibbard interprets (M) and sentences that contain unasserted 23 See Gibbard 2003 (though Gibbard does not call his view 'plan-expressivism'). Unlike
Blackburn, Gibbard accepts that, "in one sense", his view is non-cognitivist (2003 p. 184; see also Gibbard 1990, p. 8) . He first offers a "possibility proof" to show that there can be judgements of adopting a plan that behave very much like normative judgements, and he proposes the hypothesis that normative judgements "have much to do with" these judgements of adopting a plan (see pp. 20, 138-9, 179).
normative clauses as expressions of non-cognitive attitudes, in his case the adoption of plans. 24 But he also gives an argument to show that all planners are committed to the claim that (P) There is a natural property that constitutes being okay to do.
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Non-cognitivists could try to use this argument to show that their view is compatible with (A). For if there is natural property that constitutes being okay to do, they may think, a normative judgement is correct if and only if the object to which it ascribes this property really has this property.
Gibbard's argument can be presented as follows. 26 Call a consistent plan that covers any situation that anyone could ever be in a 'hyperplan'. 27 Since planners must identify acts in terms of their natural properties, Gibbard thinks, a hyperplan must have the following form:
In situation s 1 , perform an act with natural property N 1 , in situation s 2 , perform an act with natural property N 2 , . . .
Consider next the property of having either natural property N 1 , or natural property N 2 , . . . .
Call this property 'N*'. Any hyperplan can then be reformulated as follows:
In any possible situation, perform an act with natural property N*.
24 See Gibbard 2003, p. 183, and 1990, pp. 164-6 . 25 Gibbard 2003, pp. 95-6. What Gibbard means by 'constitutes' is that for any alternative a open in any possible situation s, alternative a is okay to do in s just in case a in s has property N. He initially calls property N a "prosaically factual" property, but he later argues that it is, in a broad sense, a natural property (pp. 98-102 Gibbard takes this to show that anyone who adopts a hyperplan accepts that there is a natural property N* that constitutes being okay to do. This means that anyone who adopts a hyperplan accepts (P).
Call a state of both having adopted a hyperplan and having a complete and consistent set of descriptive beliefs a 'hyperstate'. 28 And call a planner 'committed' to a claim if he would accept this claim in every hyperstate he could reach from his present plans and descriptive beliefs without changing his mind. 29 If anyone who adopts a hyperplan accepts (P), all planners would accept (P) in every hyperstate they could reach without changing their minds. According to Gibbard, this shows that all planners are committed to (P).
But does it also show that non-cognitivism is compatible with (A)? I think not.
Suppose again that Fred thinks that euthanasia is always permissible and Susan thinks that it is always impermissible. If plan-expressivism is true, Fred has then adopted the following plan:
To always allow people to have euthanasia.
And Susan has adopted the following plan:
To never allow people to have euthanasia.
Since these are conflicting plans, the hyperplans Fred and Susan can reach from these plans are conflicting hyperplans, according to which different natural properties constitute being okay to do. This means that even if Gibbard is right that Fred and Susan are both committed to the claim that there is a natural property that constitutes being okay to do, they are committed to different claims about which natural property constitutes being okay to do. And if plan-expressivism is true, which natural property constitutes being okay to do does not 28 Gibbard 2003, pp. 54, 90. Gibbard actually Gibbard's view guarantees neither that all competent speakers use a given normative predicate to ascribe the same natural property (which they call 'univocity'), nor that there is an independent standard of correctness for normative judgements to which speakers are answerable (which they call 'objectivity'). (1984, p. 210) . Similarly, when considering the "Platonistic" view that ordinary judgements about rationality are beliefs about non-natural facts, Gibbard 1990 says that "[i] f this is what anyone seriously believes, then I simply want to debunk it" (p. 154), though he also says that this is not a strong strain in ordinary thought. Ridge 2009 also says that, since we normally seem to think that normative sentences express beliefs, his version of expressivism implies "that our understanding of ourselves is in an important way mistaken" (p. 230).
Non-cognitivism and the error theory
Does this show that non-cognitivism is false? That depends on whether there is a defensible alternative to non-cognitivism that is compatible with (A) and with our other pre-theoretical thoughts about normative judgements. As I said in §4, I think there is such an alternative: the error theory, according to which normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties even though these properties do not exist. Like non-cognitivism, the error theory is a version of irrealism, since it denies that there are normative properties in the sense of real features of things in the world. But it is a cognitivist version of irrealism, since it says that normative judgements do aim to represent such features.
When non-cognitivists attack cognitivism, they often ignore the error theory. Consider again Blackburn's interpretation of the claim that (M) What makes an action right or wrong is not that we approve or disapprove of this action.
Calling his own interpretation of (M) the 'internal' reading and the cognitivist interpretation of (M) the 'external' reading, Blackburn writes:
There would be an external reading if realism were true. For in that case there would be a fact, a state of affairs . . . whose rise and fall and dependency on others could be charted. But anti-realism acknowledges no such state of affairs and no such dependency.
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This ignores the fact that error theorists, who agree that there is no such state of affairs, can endorse the external reading of (M). Rejecting realism is therefore not enough to refute the external reading of (M). But in the argument that Blackburn elsewhere gives against the error theory, he takes his own internal reading of claims like (M) for granted.
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I have elsewhere argued that there are no normative properties, at least not in the sense of real features of things in the world. 35 Since non-cognitivism and the error theory are both versions of irrealism, they are both compatible with this conclusion. But unlike noncognitivism, the error theory is also compatible with (A). Non-cognitivists may deny this:
they may say that if the error theory is true, all normative judgements are false, which means that all normative judgements are incorrect. But (A) does not say that When two people make conflicting normative judgements, one of these judgements is correct.
Instead, what (A) says is that When two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct.
I think that (A) is made true by the nature of normative judgements: it is made true by the nature of normative judgements being such that when two of these judgements conflict, at most one of them is correct. (A) does not say or imply that the world is such that when two normative judgements conflict, it actually makes one of these judgements correct. Unlike non-cognitivism, therefore, the error theory is compatible with (A).
Non-cognitivists could reply that in addition to thinking that (A) is true, we also think that (C) Some normative judgements are correct.
Since the error theory implies that all normative judgements are false, non-cognitivists could 34 Blackburn 1993, p. 153 35 See Streumer 2008 , 2011 and 2013b say, it implies that all normative judgements are incorrect. If incompatibility with our pretheoretical thoughts is fatal to a philosophical view, they could therefore say, this is just as fatal to the error theory as it is to non-cognitivism.
But I think there is an important difference between (A) and (C). As I said in §2, (A)
is a central pre-theoretical thought about normative judgements, in the sense that it partly determines what normative judgements are. A theory about normative judgements that is incompatible with (A) therefore partly changes the subject. (C) is clearly also a pretheoretical thought about normative judgements. But if an attitude aims to represent the world, our pre-theoretical thoughts about this attitude cannot guarantee that this attitude is correct, since these thoughts cannot guarantee that the world is as this attitude represents it to be. This means that, unlike (A), (C) is not a central pre-theoretical thought about normative judgements, in the sense that (C) does not partly determine what normative judgements are. A theory about normative judgements that is incompatible with (C) therefore does not change the subject.
Non-cognitivists could also say that charitable interpretation supports their view rather than the error theory, since charitable interpretation requires that we interpret others' claims in such a way that most of these claims turn out to be true. But charitable interpretation does not in fact require this. 36 For example, charitable interpretation of religious believers' claims about God does not require that we interpret these claims in such a way that most of these claims turn out to be true. Charitable interpretation therefore does not support non-cognitivism.
Finally, non-cognitivists may say that that the connection between normative judgements and motivation supports their view rather than the error theory, since this connection shows that normative judgements are motivating states rather than attitudes that aim to represent the world. But many normative judgements, such as epistemic judgements or judgements about theoretical rationality, are not closely connected to motivation at all. And though there is probably a defeasible global connection between making moral judgements and motivation, it is clearly possible to make an individual moral judgement without being 36 See Cuneo 2006, pp. 59-60. motivated to act in accordance with this judgement. This weak connection between moral judgements and motivation therefore does not support non-cognitivism either.
I therefore think that the error theory is a defensible alternative to non-cognitivism that is compatible with both (A) and our other pre-theoretical thoughts about normative judgements. Since the error theory is a version of cognitivism, this means that cognitivism is true.
Conclusion
I conclude that, contrary to what non-cognitivists think, normative judgements aim to represent the world. Of course, that does not mean that these judgements ever succeed at representing the world. But if we believe that normative judgements aim to represent the world, we may be unable to believe that none of them succeed. 37 
